Literature Review

The fate of animals under human control has become a challenge of our time. One of the key dimensions of the ‘animal turn’ we are witnessing is the concept of ‘animal welfare.’ Unlike animal rights or abolitionist doctrines, animal welfare has gained some form of universal recognition. But it has different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. As practised in the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), ‘animal welfare’ is substantially deprived of any ethical foundation and is rather an economic- and efficiency-driven concept that legitimizes the industrial exploitation of animals. In the same vein, the recognition of ‘animal welfare’ as a universal issue by WTO dispute settlement institutions in the Seals dispute should not overshadow its anthropocentric dimension in a way that augments the suspicion that ‘animal welfare’ is a vehicle of cultural imperialism.

This invited commentary offers a reflection on Steelman’s proposal that the concept of occupational justice applies equally to non-human animals as to humans. As an author of the concept of occupational justice, I welcome the insights offered on justice and rights. It resonates with the work of other champions of animal rights, and is a timely addition to Kiepek’s recent article, Occupation in the anthropocene and ethical relationality, published in the Canadian Journal of Occupational Therapy.

COVID-19 and the prospect of a sixth mass extinction, among other crises, have underscored the urgency of recognizing humans' ethical and ecological entanglements with the more-than-human world. In light of these entanglements, this article brings together theories of occupational justice with those of animal rights in order to stimulate further discussion toward the development of a multispecies theory of occupational justice. First, a precedent and basis for nonhuman occupational rights is established in Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. Second, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s political theory of animal rights is invoked as a lens through which to understand how various types of nonhuman animals are differentially at risk for experiencing four occupational injustices: occupational deprivation, alienation, displacement, and apartheid. The article concludes that a commitment to multispecies occupational justice changes how science is practiced. Implications for occupational science and adjacent design sciences are explored, as well as directions for future research and political work.

COVID-19 con brio identified the intersectionality between humans and animals. This confirmed interlinkage between human and animal health and welfare led to the emergence of the ‘One Health’, casu quo, ‘One Welfare’ discourse. Regarding the current momentum of animal-human integration and following the footsteps of these movements, the time has come to consider a ‘One Right’ approach to address legal rights for (nonhuman) animals in Europe. This chapter will zoom in on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The focal point is whether or not animals have rights under this Article 8. In order to answer this highly topical question, it is vital to first demarcate what animal rights might entail. In the concluding part, a concise overview of the analysis of Article 8 of the ECHR will be presented, in tandem with a brief exploration into future prospects.

The burgeoning movement advocating legal personhood for animals is gaining momentum, aiming to elevate animals from mere property to beings with protective rights. Legal personhood, a concept that has evolved over time, has been granted to various entities, including corporations, ships, estates, idols, and institutions. Globally, non-human entities, such as animals, rivers, and forests, have been recognized as legal persons, enabling them to engage in legal actions through human representatives as spokespersons. In this context, some studies emphasize that science-backed judgments and legislation offer a solid foundation and are more practical to formulate and implement. This interdisciplinary approach to legal personhood for animals is crucial for reshaping animal rights in India

Growing scientific evidence shows that vast numbers of nonhuman animals are sentient, and ethicists have argued that this means they have moral value. However, law’s integration of individual animals as subjects with greater protection has been slow, despite the extreme threats that animals face today from human sources like climate change and industrial exploitation. Personhood has been heralded by some as a new legal status to protect animals, but the concept of “legal personhood” has been misunderstood. Most recently, New York’s highest court decided in a case of first impression that an elephant named Happy is not a legal person and does not have a right to liberty—over two impassioned dissents. This Article offers a new synthesis of views regarding the moral status of animals, their “basic rights,” and the relationship between basic rights and legal personhood. I argue that sentient animals have moral status that requires recognition of basic rights based on considerations of justice, which may lead to legal personhood over the long term. First, I argue that at least sentient animals have moral status and are subjects of justice who require greater legal protections. Then, I assess a new “bundle theory” of legal personhood that shows that personhood is a cluster concept composed of multiple “incidents.” I argue that American law should better recognize basic rights to bodily integrity, liberty, and probably life for sentient animals, and should correct a mistaken view that personhood is the simple ability to hold rights. However, basic rights are only one incident of legal personhood, although recognizing them may help lead to animal personhood in time. To inform litigation, I also show how the bundle theory helps to explain the important disagreement between the judges in Happy’s case. Finally, I suggest that both legislatures and judges can work to enhance animal legal rights, and perhaps eventually legal personhood, in the United States.

This book addresses one of today’s most urgent issues: the loss of wildlife and habitat, which together constitute an ecological crisis. Combining studies from different disciplines such as law, political science and criminology, with a focus on animal rights, the chapters explore the successes and failures of the international wildlife conservation and trade treaties, CITES and the BERN Convention. While these conventions have played a crucial role in protecting endangered species from trade and in the rewilding of European large carnivores, the case studies in this book demonstrate huge variations in their implementation and enforcement across Europe. In conclusion, the book advocates for a non-anthropocentric policy approach to strengthen wildlife conservation in Europe.

Studies show that the number of illegal wolf theriocides in Poland is significant and increasing. According to research, between 2002 and 2020 there were 91 cases of killings. On the other hand, between 1922 and 2022 we were able to identify only nine rulings related to the wolf crimes. It should be noticed that this situation is not justified by the official state approach to killing wolves in Poland. These animals have been a strictly protected species ever since 1998 and since then there has been no issuing of state licences for general population reduction. The chapter focuses on the social and legal factors influencing the effectiveness of combating the illegal killing of wolves in Poland. Our main argument is that these factors are, at the same time, the greatest problems for law enforcement authorities to effectively counteract the illegal wolf theriocides, especially when it comes to not only anthropogenic but also financial approaches in criminal law.

Unprecedented demands have recently arrived at the doorstep of courts and parliaments the world over: nonhuman animals should receive some of the rights that have so far been reserved to human beings. This development has raised fundamental questions about the nature of legal rights, and who should have them. More Equal Than Others: Humans and the Rights of Other Animals provides a sustained analysis of the fundamental rights of human and nonhuman animals to explore the issue of whether conferring fundamental legal rights to animals would undermine the equal status and rights of humans.

Non-human rights are becoming part of our ordinary legal landscape and vocabulary. Animals, rivers, mountains, rainforests, ecosystems and synthetic or artificial entities such as machines, AI and robots are currently regarded or in the process of being considered subjects of rights in different parts of the world. This introduction to the volume Non-Human Rights: Critical Perspectives explores and provides a critical outlook on this emerging trend. It also overviews the contributions to the volume, which analyse the limitations and possibilities of non-human rights and their paradoxes and relevance for our critical juncture.

Imagine a perfect food system. What would you find there? Only good food! Such food tastes good; it is, more broadly, aesthetically valuable. But it also plays cultural and symbolic roles, featuring in people's identities, sense of place, and traditions. Such a system also needs to preclude scarcity, cruelty, and injustice. A perfect food system is just. The central thesis of Josh Milburn's new book is that such a system need not be a vegan food system, even though it would be “rights-respecting” (i.e., would prohibit and prevent the violations of rights of both humans and other animals). Milburn's provocative claim, at least to readers familiar with animal ethics, is that non-vegan, animal-rights-respecting food production methods should not only be allowed by the zoopolis – the polity that recognizes the political rights of other animals – but also institutionally supported.

In various cultures and epochs, people have treated animals differently. The Bible contains a prohibition on obtaining meat from living animals. This means that such cruel practices were used. The modern philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that one’s attitude toward animals is indicative of how one relates to humans. As he said, “He who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men. We can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals” (Kant, 2005: Duties to Animals and Spirits). The above statement appears to be a universal truth. Therefore, one should not assume that the issue of human-inflicted suffering on animals and ways to mitigate it is something new in the history of civilization. What is new is the question of animal rights. Even for Kant, the idea of animals having rights was inconceivable (Kant, 2012). Why? Because as “non-thinking” beings,...