Literature Review

In recent decades, concern has been mounting over whether democratic governments have the necessary incentives and capabilities to protect the long-term interests of their citizens, particularly their future citizens. Both the academic literature on governance and everyday political discourse are replete with talk of ‘short-termism’, ‘political myopia’, ‘policy short-sightedness’, a ‘presentist bias’ and weak ‘anticipatory governance. Such concerns have been intensified by the growing capacity of humanity to cause ‘severe, pervasive and irreversible’ damage to critical biophysical systems at a planetary level, for example via anthropogenic climate change3. But flawed environmental stewardship is not the only problem.

A growing global wave of climate change litigation is led by minors, relying on their human rights, as well as those of future generations against governments and their failure to take action on climate change. Such litigation is emerging also before the Court of Justice of the European Union, where the ambitiousness of the EU’s climate change policies, embodied in the 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework, is challenged. This may suggest a possible ‘rights turn’ in EU climate change litigation, where the use of rights claims intensifies and allows stakeholders traditionally excluded from decision making to raise their concerns in a judicial forum. This article explains why this trend has failed to materialize in the EU through an analysis of EU environmental law particularities. From this view, it shows the shortcomings of the 2030 Framework, and by drawing inspiration from successful enforcement of statutory obligations in EU air quality legislation, the article suggests how these may be remedied in future legislative action.

In this article I argue that governments are justified in addressing the potential for human induced climate damages on the basis of future generations' rights to bodily integrity and personal property. First, although future generations' entitlements to property originate in our present entitlements, the principle of self-ownership requires us to take 'reasonable care' of the products of future labour. Second, while Parfit's non-identity problem has as yet no satisfactory solution, the present absence of an equilibrium between theory and intuitions justifies a precautionary approach, i.e. treating climate damage as a wrongful harm. In addition, a supplementary consideration is described as arising from transcendental needs.

Given that future generations are right-bearing citizens of tomorrow, legislative systems should secure these rights through appropriate institutions. In the case of the European Union, reference to intergenerational justice can be found in various fundamental legal texts, but, paradoxically, no institutions exist to defend it. The structural short-termism inscribed into representative democracies means that present interests easily trump future concerns. We argue that the best way to overcome this problem is a system of temporal checks and balances. By comparing a selection of existing instruments with regards to their impact on the legislative process, we propose the creation of a European Guardian for Future Generations as the most effective measure to protect the rights of future generations and provide an overview of recent developments in this direction.

Representing unborn generations to more suitably include future interests in today's climate policymaking has sparked much interest in recent years. In this review we survey the main proposed instruments to achieve this effect, some of which have been attempted in polities such as Israel, Philippines, Wales, Finland, and Chile. We first review recent normative work on the idea of representing future people in climate governance: The grounds on which it has been advocated, and the main difficulties that traditional forms of representation have encountered when applied to this particular case. We then survey existing institutional means to represent generations to come. We separate out representation in courts, in parliament, and by independent bodies, and review specific instruments including climate litigation, parliamentary commissions, future representatives, youth quotas, and independent offices for future generations. We examine the particular forms whereby each of these may suitably represent future people, including audience representation, surrogate representation, and indicative representation, and discuss the main challenges they encounter in so doing.

A central issue in environmental ethics is characterization of our “moral relationship” to future generations. What, if any, obligations do we owe to the future? How should our present actions be influenced by their impact on the future? The purpose of this article is to characterize and hopefully clarify certain aspects of this “moral relationship.” First, the article identifies those distinctive qualities that distinguish a moral analysis of our relationship to future generations from the moral analysis that will apply to an assessment of our actions on our own generation. It suggests that the issue of our moral relationship to future generations has a distinct component only for those actions that have irreversible consequences that will be experienced more than two generations in the future. Actions with shorter term consequences may be properly seen as raising the same concerns that apply to disputes among existing humans. Second, the article evaluates our moral relationship to future generations in terms that are familiar in Western ethical thought. For many, this moral relationship should be analyzed in terms of “rights” and “obligations” - moral claims that the future somehow makes on us. There are substantial conceptual and technical problems in evaluating our moral relationship to the future in rights-based terms. Furthermore, the outcome of a rights-based approach can be a set of proposed rights and obligations that are not meaningful guides for present decisions. Finally, and most importantly, the article suggests that our moral relationship to future generations may best be viewed, not in terms of rights and obligations, but through reliance on “virtue ethics.” Our concern for the future can be seen as an expression of the principle of benevolence and a recognition of the dignity and worth of all life. Through virtue theory, the morality of our actions are to be evaluated, not from the perspective of demands or claims that the future might be said to make on us, but rather from the recognition that our concern for the future is an expression of our best virtue. This shift in perspective has direct consequences. A focus on present virtue leads to the recognition that we must evaluate the morality of our actions in terms of our own vision of the well-being and the quality of life that we wish to see experienced in the future. It anchors the analysis of actions in the moral framework that we hold today without presuming to predict the moral and non-moral preferences of an infinite stream of future generations.

This paper analyses the main challenges (particularly those deriving from the non-identity problem and epistemic uncertainty concerning the preferences of future persons) to the idea that we should and can represent future generations in our present policymaking. It argues that these challenges can and should be approached from the perspective of human rights. To this end it introduces and sketches the main features of a human rights framework derived from the moral theory of Alan Gewirth. It indicates how this framework can be grounded philosophically, sketches the main features and open questions of the framework and its grounding, and shows how it can be used to deal with the challenges to the idea that future generations have rights that can be represented in our policymaking.

The purpose of this paper is to propose and consider a new constitutional provision that can contribute to the protection of the vital needs of future generations. The proposal I wish to elaborate can be termed the posterity provision, and it has both substantive and procedural elements. The aim of this constitutional provision is twofold. The first is to encourage state authorities to make more future-oriented deliberations and decisions. The second is to create more public awareness and improve the process of public deliberation about issues affecting near and remote future generations. It is argued that a good case can be made for the proposed reforms compared with alternative substantive constitutional environmental provisions found in existing constitutions and in the literature on legal and political theory. The main reason for this is that the proposed law constitutes a better and more adequate basis for judicial enforcement than the alternatives, which tend to be very vague or unclear. In this connection, I contend that there are both epistemological and moral reasons for introducing constitutional provisions that focus on the protection of critical natural resources essential for meeting the basic physiological needs of future people. It is also argued that the posterity provision can be defended on the basis of central ideas and ideals in recent theory of deliberative democracy.

This paper argues, mainly on the basis of Rawls's savings principle, Wissenburg''s restraint principle, Passmore's chains of love, and De-Shalit's transgenerational communities, for a doubleinterpretation of sustainable development as a principle of intergenerational justice and a future-oriented green ideal. This doubleinterpretation (1) embraces the restraint principle and the argument that no individual can claim an unconditional right to destroy environmental goods as a baseline that could justify directive strategies for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles, and (2) suggests that people's concerns about the deterioration of nature and the environment articulate future-oriented narratives of self-identity that could fuel non-directive strategies to develop further responsibilities towards nearby future generations. Sustainable development, thus, provides sound arguments to restrict people's freedom to follow their own lifestyles, when these lifestyles transgressed the baseline of the restraint principle. However, the individual freedom of choice should not be restricted for any further environmental considerations. Non-directive strategies are thus to stimulate the development of such further responsibilities towards nearby future generations.

In this paper, I defend the view that within a rights-based ethical framework, the moral status of future generations is best under- stood as that of present rightsholders. I argue that in this way it can be justified that we have obligations towards future generations. This justification in turn is of great relevance for many issues in moral theory and applied ethics. In the first part of the paper, I argue that the fact that future persons will have rights in the future cannot fully account for present obligations. The missing link in this argument cannot be provided by approaches that infer those obligations mediately. In the second part of the paper, I argue that existing is not a necessary condition for being a rightsholder. First, our own future selves should be said to have rights even though they do not exist at present. Second, even at present, uncertainty challenges the relationship between rightsholders and obligation bearers: of- ten enough, obligations depend on presuppositions or suspicions about other persons' existence. In light of these cases, we should conceive of rightsholders as place holders, that is, sets of (actual) individuals whose existence or identity can be unknown or indetermined, with specific properties. Therefore, future generations can coherently be said to have rights now that correspond to our present obligations towards them.

We read every day about the desecration of our environment and the mismanagement of our natural resources. We have always had the capacity to wreck the environment on a small or even regional scale. Centuries of irrigation without adequate drainage in ancient times converted large areas of the fertile Tigris-Euphrates valley into barren desert. What is new is that we now have the power to change our global environment irreversibly, with profoundly damaging effects on the robustness and integrity of the planet and the heritage that we pass to future generations.

Exploring the peculiar nature of future generations and concluding that types of future people is the most promising object on which to project our concern for future generations the article poses two main questions: “Can future people have rights?” and, if so, “Do they in fact have any rights?” The article first explains why the non-existence of future people raises doubts whether future generations can have rights. Within the philosophical literature, the leading approach explaining how future people can, nevertheless, have rights argues that they have rights as tokens of types of people. After presenting this account of the rights of future people and couching it in a jurisprudential context, this Article points out a possible deficiency in the approach’s metaphysical underpinnings. Assuming that future people can have rights the article goes on to explain that there is reason to doubt whether any such rights actually exist, which derive from the doubt whether future people will be harmed by most actions and choices in their prenatal past. According to what has come to be known as the “nonidentity argument,” actions and choices that are necessary parts of the causal chain leading up to the existence of a person cannot harm that person - had the act or choice not occurred that person would have never existed, and one is better off existing than not. Under the two prevalent theories of rights, the Will Theory and the Interest Theory, the nonidentity argument seemingly entails that future people have no rights. After exploring how this is the case, the conception of harm underlying the nonidentity argument is analyzed. Two types of interests future people may have in prenatal identity-determinative events (constitutive interests and threshold interests) are explored as possible sources of certain rights future people may have - the nonidentity argument notwithstanding. The article then elaborates and assesses the merits of these approaches