Literature Review

Framed against the background of anthropocentric and ecocentric values, the specific themes of this article are located in the developing discourse of Earth Jurisprudence and Wild Law. Critically, the article argues that connection with nature—and specifically, with land—underpins any transformation of property law from an anthropocentric, individualist concept to a more ecocentric and relational one. It draws upon evidence from psychology, sociology and environmental education to demonstrate that connection with nature is central to fostering a Wild Law of property. The article then addresses how such connections can be developed by education, focusing upon the experiences and opportunities offered by initiatives such as Forest School and suggesting these represent emerging forms of Wild Education.

Place attachment and ecocentric attitude are the important determinants of conservation behaviour, especially for traditionally managed landscapes. In this paper, we explore the relationship between place attachment and the ecocentric attitude of farmers engaged in Jhum cultivation (shifting cultivation or slash-and-burn cultivation) in the Zunheboto District of Nagaland, India. We administered a questionnaire survey (n = 153) based on a widely used four-dimensional place attachment framework and a well-known cognitive scale for measuring ecocentric attitude. The results indicate that Jhum farmers' modest ecocentric attitude is significantly associated with their place attachment, especially with place identity and place dependence, although their behaviour of organized deforestation is in apparent contradiction. While an ecocentric attitude generally contributes to environmentally responsible behaviour, we argue that, for Jhum farmers, the absence of such a causal relationship is influenced by other rationalities, particularly owing to the lack of alternative livelihood opportunities. The findings of this study establish the inherent positive ecocentric attitude of Jhum farmers who are often held responsible for deforestation and environmental degradation. Furthermore, we argue that such an inherent positive ecocentric attitude and a strong place attachment are imperative to implement place-based models for sustainable mountain agriculture.

Various attempts have been made to amalgamate the concepts of intrinsic value and ecosystem services, often with a stop-over at the economic concept of existence value. These attempts are based on a confusion of concepts, however. In this article, two types of non-use values are distinguished: warm glow value, related to the satisfaction people may derive from altruism towards nature, and existence value, related to the satisfaction people may derive from the mere knowledge that nature exists and originating in the human need for self-transcendence. As benefits to humans, warm glow and existence values can be considered ecosystem services. Neither warm glow value nor existence value represents benefits to nature itself, however. Intrinsic value lies outside the scope of the wide palette of ecosystem services. Although the concept of ecosystem services does not cover benefits to nature and the intrinsic value of such benefits, intrinsic value is not necessarily incompatible with economic valuation. Although a deontological ethics does not allow economic valuation of nature as an end in itself, consequentialism does. In consequentialism, however, intrinsic value is not attributed to nature itself, but to benefits to nature. These benefits can be economically valued on the basis of benefit transfer.

With scant evidence that market-based conservation works, argues Douglas J. McCauley, the time is ripe for returning to the protection of nature for nature’s sake.

While many of the concerns over the economic valuation of nature have gained broad exposure, justice concerns remain largely peripheral. Within both scholarly debate and actual valuation exercises, the emphasis is most often on reconciling cultural and monetary valuation. Increasingly, as the valuation of nature gains momentum, proponents of the trend seek to relieve apprehensions by suggesting that economic valuation is entirely compatible with intrinsic and esthetic values. This attempt to mollify skeptics, however, misses the mark; regardless of whether or not nature may be valued simultaneously in cultural and economic terms, the social and environmental justice implications of monetary valuation remain. The purpose of this commentary is to clarify that much of the resistance to the economic valuation of nature is motivated by these justice concerns and that reassurances about the cultural value of nature do little to quell them. Several of the justice reasons to remain cautious of the economic valuation of nature are also elaborated.

One of the greatest obstacles to the conservation, wise use, and sound management, of natural ecosystems, is that Man does not recognize, or else grossly under-values, the functions and services of these systems. Forests are cut, trees are burned, and animal populations are destroyed, with little regard for the free services which ecosystems provide. Because these services which are rendered by natural systems at the local, regional, and global, levels remain widely unrecognized, the values of natural systems (beyond their market value of extract-able goods) seldom influence land-use decisions. More-over, mechanisms to reflect such values and to influence management decisions accordingly, are widly absent The objectives of this paper are to describe the values of goods and services of natural ecosystems, and to structure these values into a functional framework. This formalization provides recognition of total value of natural ecosystems, and provides also a mechanism to translate values into action decisions. Because of the rapid destruction and conversion of tropical forests and the urgent need for conservation of this unique resource, we have chosen examples from such ecosystems to illustrate our value scheme.

A cornerstone of environmental policy is the debate over protecting nature for humans’ sake (instrumental values) or for nature’s (intrinsic values) (1). We propose that focusing only on instrumental or intrinsic values may fail to resonate with views on personal and collective well-being, or “what is right,” with regard to nature and the environment. Without complementary attention to other ways that value is expressed and realized by people, such a focus may inadvertently promote worldviews at odds with fair and desirable futures. It is time to engage seriously with a third class of values, one with diverse roots and current expressions: relational values. By doing so, we reframe the discussion about environmental protection, and open the door to new, potentially more productive policy approaches.

In recent years, conservation planning, policy, and communications have increasingly emphasized the human benefits, or “ecosystem services,” provided by nonhuman nature. In response to this utilitarian, anthropocentric framing, some conservationists have countered that nonhuman nature is valuable for more than its instrumental use to humans. In other words, these critics maintain that nonhuman nature has intrinsic value, which the ecosystem services paradigm fails to duly acknowledge. Proponents of the ecosystem services approach have responded in turn, either by proposing that intrinsic value can be integrated into the ecosystem services framework, or by justifying the pull away from intrinsic value on the grounds that it does not motivate broad support for conservation. We suggest these debates have been clouded by an ambiguous conceptualization of intrinsic value, which in fact has a rich intellectual heritage in philosophy and environmental ethics. We therefore review some of the major work from these literatures, to provide members of the conservation community with a deeper understanding of intrinsic value that, we hope, will inform more focused and productive discourse. Following this review, we highlight two common ways intrinsic value has been misinterpreted in recent debates around ecosystem services. As a result of these misinterpretations, we argue, the non-anthropocentric ethical concerns raised by many critics of the ecosystem services approach remain effectively unaddressed. We conclude by offering logical, practical, and moral reasons why the concept of intrinsic value continues to be relevant to conservationists, even and especially in the emerging ecosystem services paradigm.

Integrating ecology and economics is increasingly important as humanity's impact on the natural world increases. Current paradigms in both fields are too narrow (and seem to be getting narrower). This paper introduces and summarizes this special issue of Ecological Modeling devoted to ecological economics. There are eleven papers (including this one) that cover most of the importan theoretical issues involved (applied papers are left for a future volume). These issues are: (1) sustainability; (2) inter- and intra-species distribution of wealth; (3) discounting and intergenerational justice; and (4) dealing with non-monetized values, imprecision, and uncertainty. This collection is seen as a hopeful first step toward a true synthesis of ecology and economics that could lead to better management of renewable and non-renewable natural resources and a sustainable future.

This article argues that the declaration of principles for a global warming convention should include a reference to the rights of future generations to a livable planet. While such a declaration may not result in the creation of actual legal powers, such a declaration is important simply because rights for future generations are not the current expectation, or norm. Regime theory maintains that regimes for international cooperation are formed by the convergent expectations of the regime's members and by behavioral regularities regarding those expectations. Developing a regime for international cooperation on global warming that is cognizant of the rights of future generations may require evidence of potential impact on future generations. Development of knowledge-based (epistemic) communities at the domestic and international levels regarding that impact may, by promoting convergent expectations and behavioral regularities, help to establish norms for present generations.

International institutions that purport to represent future generations have the potential to act as powerful vehicles for promoting sustainability. The normative basis for this approach rests on an assumption that international institutions ought to promote justice – including intergenerational justice. The massive bias against future generations in contemporary rule-making and institutions justifies international institutions with a mandate to represent future generations as a means for redressing this imbalance. The democratic ideal also justifies such institutions which can provide a voice for future generations that are inevitably impacted by contemporary decision-making. These normative arguments are explored in relation to a proposed UN Commissioner for future generations. This case study addresses the question of how a mandate for such an institution should best be framed – in terms of human rights or sustainability, and also the democratic legitimacy of such institutions. The chapter concludes with some proposals for further research.

This paper critically evaluates the notion and application of economic, monetary valuation of biological diversity, or biodiversity. For this purpose four levels of diversity are considered: genes, species, ecosystems and functions. Different perspectives on biodiversity value can be characterized through a number of factors: instrumental vs. intrinsic values, local vs. global diversity, life diversity vs. biological resources, etc. A classification of biodiversity values is offered, based on a system of logical relationships among biodiversity, ecosystems, species and human welfare. Suggestions are made about which economic valuation methods can address which type of biodiversity value. The resulting framework is the starting point for a survey and evaluation of empirical studies at each of the four levels of diversity. The contingent valuation method is by far the most used method. An important reason is that the other valuation methods are unable to identify and measure passive or nonuse values of biodiversity. At first sight, the resulting monetary value estimates seem to give unequivocal support to the belief that biodiversity has a significant, positive social value. Nevertheless, most studies lack a uniform, clear perspective on biodiversity as a distinct concept from biological resources. In fact, the empirical literature fails to apply economic valuation to the entire range of biodiversity benefits. Therefore, available economic valuation estimates should generally be regarded as providing a very incomplete perspective on, and at best lower bounds, to the unknown value of biodiversity changes.