Literature Review

Possible environmental and related impacts of human activity are shown to include the extinction of humanity and other sentient species, excessive human numbers, and a deteriorating quality of life (I). I proceed to argue that neither future rights, nor Kantian respect for future people's autonomy, nor a contract between the generations supplies a plausible basis of obligations with regard to future generations. Obligations concern rather promoting the well-being of the members of future generations, whoever they may be, as well as of current generations. Future benefits and costs should only be discounted where there are special reasons for doing do so (e.g. relevant opportunity costs) (II). A sustainable economy is held to be necessary for intergenerational equity. This granted, principles of equity are introduced concerning: compensation for long-term risks and for resource depletion; conserving the stock of resources, resource diversity, and assimilative capacity; equal options and opportunities for each generation; and remedying past failures to conserve environmental quality. Rules and policies considered include: an efficient, diversified, and ecologically sustainable economy; no increase of risk of irreversible environmental change; and action despite uncertainty to avert serious future outcomes (the Precautionary Principle). These policies are argued to require rectification of current injustices within and between current generations (III). Finally, the recently resuscitated metaphysical model of society as a partnership between generations is held to imply the view of each generation as trustees rather than owners of the planet. This trusteeship view is independently credible, and supportive of the principles and policies earlier introduced; and its adoption by successive generations could turn the partnership model into a reality (IV).

This article compliments one by Doorn entitled “Do ecosystems have ethical rights?” in which she recounts the history of philosophical and ethical thought concerning the value of ecosystems. She notes that anthropocentrists do not acknowledge the intrinsic value of nature. Here, we argue that changing our perspective of what leads to human well-being is more important than valuing ecosystems based solely on their monetary worth to people. We encourage a form of environmental pragmatism that reflects pluralism in how nature is valued.

This article analyzes the doctrinal findings of the Hungarian Constitutional Court with respect to the constitutional protection afforded to future generations in the Fundamental Law. It focuses on Decision No. 14/2020. (VII. 6.) AB in which the Constitutional Court abolished an amendment to the Forest Act for infringing the right to a healthy environment and the environmental interests of future generations as enshrined in Article P of the Fundamental Law. On this occasion, the Constitutional Court for the first time explicitly recognized that Article P embodies the public trust doctrine; and stressed that it confers fiduciary duties on the State to act as a trustee over the natural heritage of the nation for the benefit of future generations, which limits the executive’s discretion to exploit and regulate such resources. This article puts the Hungarian constitutional public trust in a comparative perspective by exploring the origins, role and functioning of similar constitutional public trust provisions in other jurisdictions. This is followed by setting out the normative principles derived by the Hungarian Constitutional Court in its previous practice from Article P, such as the non-derogation principle, the principle of inter-generational equity, the imperative of long-term planning, economical use of resources and the precautionary principle. The article then sets out the legal bases featured in the ex post constitutional challenge brought against the amendment of the Forest Act by the Ombudsman, and the Constitutional Court’s reasoning. It concludes with offering some wider lessons for the judicial enforcement of long-term environmental goals vis-á-vis short-term economic private interests.

Given that modern democracies face generation-transcending policy challenges, this study asks whether the interests of future generations are sufficiently taken into account in present-day parliamentary politics. Through analysis of parliamentary documents in Belgium (2010–2019), we examine whether present-day MPs make representative claims on behalf of future generations, how such claims are made and by whom. We find that MPs do formulate claims, but only to a limited extent and with little or no justification. Moreover, claims-making is driven by electoral-strategic considerations. Only those who hold prominent positions make claims for future generations and fewer claims are made in election years.

This Note posits that future generations, born and unborn, are entitled to constitutional protection from climate change. Accordingly, this Note seeks to establish that the right to a healthy environment is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, thus, invoking the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requiring the federal government to protect future generations and combat the effects of climate change. One cannot address climate change without recognizing the responsibility owed to future generations, as future generations will inevitably be affected by climate change. To ensure the survival of future generations, present generations must be proactive in securing constitutional rights for them. Failing to do so could result in the deprivation of many basic rights, such as access to clean air, water, shelter, or food for future generations.

Global existential and catastrophic risks, particularly those arising from technological developments, present challenges for intergenerational justice. We aim to present a solutions-based approach to the challenge of intergenerational inequality. We examine options for representing future generations in our present policymaking structures, drawing on case studies from Singapore, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Scotland and Wales. We derive several factors which contribute to the success of some of these institutions, and discuss reasons for the failure or abolition of others. We draw out broad lessons which we can apply to policymaking in England, and make policy recommendations based on these findings.

Sustainable Development means 'meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs'. It is a very complex and broad based concept that incorporates following principles, which are directly or indirectly applicable to developmental activities: (a) economic sustainability, (b) ecological sustainability, (c) social sustainability and (d) cultural sustainability. The sustainable development has both intra-generational and inter-generational equities and several approaches. It has some important measures too that will be discussed here.

This chapter explores the possibility of extending Sen's and Nussbaum's capability approach to the question of ecological obligations to future generations. It is argued that we can extend capability protection to future generations, but this leaves open which resources such a theory is to leave to future generations. The chapter argues that the influential views of Rawls and Solow, which hold that these resources should be conceived in terms of ‘total capital’, cannot be accepted by a capability approach because of their assumption of substitutability between natural and human-made capital. It is proposed that a capability theory of justice best fits with a combination of two ecological approaches: the ecological space approach and Herman Daly's resource rules.

A motivation problem may arise when morally principled public policy calls for serious sacrifice, relative to ways of life and levels of well-being, on the part of the members of a free society. Apart from legal or other forms of “external” coercion, what will, could, or should move people to make the sacrifices required by morality? I explore the motivation problem in the context of morally principled public policy concerning our legacy for future generations. In this context the problem raises special moral-psychological difficulties. My inquiry suggests pessimism regarding our ability to solve the motivation problem relative to what morality requires on behalf of future generations.

Neither environmental economics nor environmental philosophy have adequately examined the moral implications of imposing environmental degradation and ecosystem instability upon our descendants. A neglected aspect of these problems is the supposed extent of the burden that the current generation is placing on future generations. The standard economic position on discounting implies an ethical judgment concerning future generations. If intergenerational obligations exist, then two types of intergenerational transfer must be considered: basic distributional transfers and compensatory transfers. Basic transfers have been the central intergenerational concern of both environmental economics and philosophy, but compensatory transfers emphasize obligations of a kind often disregarded.

Our behaviour and policies with regard to nature and the environment should be guided by a code of ethics, which is to be derived from basic principles and from a pragmatic consideration of the issues at stake. The man–nature relationship has always been ambiguous, nature being seen as both a provider and an enemy. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, man is set apart from nature and called to dominate it, although this attitude has been revised to become one of stewardship. Oriental religions, on the other hand, have a more holistic view and consider humans as an integral part of nature. Modern philosophers have views ranging from anthropocentrism to biocentrism and egocentrism. It is suggested to take a pragmatic approach by which primary human needs are met first and foremost whereas the needs of other living organisms and ecosystems are allowed to prevail over secondary human needs. A plea is made to support the Earth Charter, which embodies in its principles and prescriptions a balanced respect for nature and future human generations.

Today it is widely recognised that much of the harm done to the environment is not limited by geographical, political or time barriers. From the point of view of environmental ethics, our concern for future generations arises mainly from their position of disadvantage: preceding generations can limit the opportunities bequeathed to later generations by causing irreversible harm and depleting resources. This paper first introduces some historical references; the most significant problems posed by the rights of future generations in regard to the environment are then identified, the notions of common heritage and capital as referred to the environment are discussed and the relations between sustainable development and the rights of future generations are presented. Some social aspects, legal implications and the contributions of philosophers and experts on the question of intergenerational justice in environmental terms are then analysed. An attempt is finally made to define the most significant problems involved.